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FACULTY COMMENT
International Law and Rawls' Theory of
Justice
ANTHONY D'AMATO*

Few books have achieved the status of classics as quickly as A
THEORY OF JUSTICE

by Professor John Rawls.' Published in 1971 the

work has been acclaimed as a monumental contribution to political
theory and philosophy in a torrent of favorable reviews. For this reason alone, what Rawls has to say about international law in his
book-despite the brevity of his comments on that subject-should
be of great interest to international lawyers. But, more importantly,
the complexity of present-day international law stands in an uneasy
relation to the scheme of justice propounded by Rawls, indicating
that Rawls' conception may either already be dated or may be too
simplistic. Indeed, it may not be from want of interest or familiarity
with international law that Rawls deals with that subject so briefly
in his long work, but rather that the problems now facing international lawyers may pose a conceptual threat to some of the fundamental bases upon which Rawls builds his entire theoretical edifice.
Rawls' work will be analyzed often in the months and years to
come, and thus the present essay is merely an early attempt to contribute to the dialogue. No pretension of definitiveness is made here;
quite the contrary, I want to reserve a full option to revise my opinions based upon further study of Rawls and of the commentaries
engendered by his book.
I.
The most fundamental problem suggested by an international
perspective upon Rawls' work is his choice of a "society" as the unit
for assessing justice. He starts by defining society as "a more or less
self-governing association of persons who in their relations to one
another recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and who for the
most part act in accordance with them."' It is a "closed system iso* Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School; Visiting Professor 197374, Oregon Law School; A.B., Cornell University, 1958; J.D. Harvard, 1961; Ph.D.
Columbia, 1968. Copyright 1975 by Anthony D'Amato. This essay is part of a study of
jurisprudence written under a grant from the National Science Foundation and
awarded by the National Endowment for the Humanities.
1. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 02138 (1971); L.C. 73-168432
[hereinafter cited as RAwLs].
2. RAWiS at 4.
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lated from other societies," 3 at least for the purpose of most of the
analysis of the book. Later on, in specifying the "circumstances of
justice," Rawls adds to this conception of society the idea that it
involves "many individuals coexist[ing] together at the same time
on a definite geographical territory."' These, then, are the characteristics of society. Rawls endeavors to show what constitutes a "just
5
society," and he terms his entire study an essay in social justice.
No one can object if a moral philosopher chooses to study the
problem of justice solely within a particular unit, such as a "society,"
just as no one can criticize a study of justice within a "family." But
it is legitimate to criticize a study that purports to speak of larger
aggregations while focusing upon a small unit. Rawls tends to extend
his discussion beyond social units to an international or world basis
in two ways. First, at one point in his book he directly analogizes a
nation to a person, and says that ethics among persons may be directly extended to the ethical foundations of international law.6 Second, in an indirect way Rawls conveys the impression that his theories concern mankind in general; this is accomplished by talking
about universal traits of persons (moral sentiments, for the purposes
of Rawls' study) and by dealing with societies abstractly rather than
as particular societies in today's world. Indeed, Rawls believes that
ethical theories cannot be particularistic:
[Ilt must be possible to formulate [ethical principles] without the
use of what would be intuitively recognized as proper names, or rigged
definite descriptions .... [Pirinciples are to be universal in application. They must hold for everyone in virtue of their being moral persons.7

Let us postpone for the moment the direct comparison Rawls makes
between nations and individuals, and examine the claim that his
theories apply to moral persons in general.
The basic question thus becomes: how can a universal system of
justice be worked out for persons if we refuse to examine issues that
transcend national boundaries? Or, in other words, can Rawls defend
his limitation of inquiry to given societies rather than all (international) societies? This abstract question can best be handled by some
concrete examples. For instance, Rawls considers one principle of
social justice to be the "difference principle," that is, social and
economic inequalities are permissible if and only if the arrangements
generating them work out better for the most disadvantaged person
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

126.
8-9.
377-82.
131-32.

1975

INTERNATIONAL

LAW AND RAWLS

(the "worst-off" position) than would any more equal structure.8
Such a principle would clearly imply, among other things, that a new
tax law should be passed which takes from the rich and gives (via
what one might call a "negative income tax") to the poor, and this
money transfer should occur unremittingly up to the point that any
further taking-from-the-rich would reduce the capitalist's production
incentive to the point where the poor would be worse off due to the
drop-off of capital investment. Now this principle, to be sure, may
be difficult to interpret in practice. How can we tell, for example,
when a disincentive to invest further actually sets in? Would we wait
for rich persons to quit their corporate jobs and make public statements that they are not any longer able to keep enough after taxes
to make it desirable for them to put in another day's work? And how
about corporations pondering long-term capital investments or research and development programs? Nevertheless, difficulties of interpretation aside, the ethical principle asserted by Rawls is that a
person can get richer only if he is helping everyone else to become
richer as well, via the fruits of his labor or his business acumen. A
person does not have an ethical claim to get richer at society's expense. Yet, even if this principle is operationalized within a society,
can it apply across societies? Should there be enormous taxes upon
the incomes of rich persons in industrialized societies so that the
money can be paid over to masses that are near starvation in India,
China, and other populous and developing nations? Should there be
an "excess profits" tax levied upon individuals and corporations for
this purpose? To some extent, of course, the "have-not" nations are
making this claim today; it takes the form of demands upon limited
United Nations resources and capital, explanations for expropriation
of foreign-owned industries, justifications for exploiting oceanic resources, and so forth. The "relative deprivation" sensed by
disadvantaged nations is itself put forward as a justification for international measures designed to reduce the disparity of wealth between
rich and poor nations. Rawls' book would probably provide an ethical
basis for such claims, assuming that his scheme can transcend social
boundaries.
But can the logical leap across such boundaries be justified?
There are two important factors, I believe, that argue against it: one
on the "supply" and one on the "demand" side of the picture. On the
supply side, we have a world that is not infinitely rich in resources.
We cannot talk of a "cowboy economy" internationally; rather, basic
minerals, food, and resources are limited and the supplies are being
8. Id. at 75-83. "[Tihe higher expectations of those better situated are just if and
only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least
advantaged members of society." Id. at 75.
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used up. In Rawls' hypothetical society, resources are sufficiently
abundant to make it possible for the best-situated person to argue
that further incentives paid to him will result in increased exploitation of natural resources so that the poor will also benefit from them.'
But if there are only limited resources, then further exploitation by
the rich can only be at the expense of the have-nots. For example,
the United States could not, under this formulation, argue that its
consumption of thirty percent of the world's energy is needed to raise
the standard of living of the masses in India. Thus, Rawls' difference
principle would boil down to a straight tax, taking from the rich and
giving to the poor, with little room, if any, for the argument that the
tax should stop at a point above that of total equality for everyone
so that incentives can be maintained. Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that either all economic disparities in the world should be eliminated (as an ethical proposition), or that there are counter-arguments
that Rawls has omitted which change the ethical calculus.
One counter-argument comes from the "demand" side of the
picture, mentioned previously. Advantaged nations tend to be less
populous than disadvantaged nations. For one thing, they tend to
hold down the birth rate voluntarily. Secondly, the very fact of a
lower population increases per capita wealth and perhaps is implicit
in the concept of an advantaged nation. Now, should a populous
disadvantaged nation have an ethical claim to the wealth of a less
populous advantaged nation? Or might the latter reply that its own
population control undertaken to provide a "better life" for all its
citizens should not be undercut by claims from a nation that has not
similarly restrained itself? Rawls discusses the population problem
only briefly, and from the standpoint of classical utilitarianism and
not his own theory of justice."0 But what is at stake for Rawls' own
theory is conceptually fundamental. We might say that a rich nation
is "rich" in terms of material wealth but not "rich" in terms of the
number of persons in it.
In other words, a nation may become rich in part by limiting its
population. A smaller family size not only increases per capita
wealth, but also frees the time of individuals to innovate and make
large capital improvements in society without having to feed and take
9. Rawls uses the condition of "moderate scarcity," which means that "[n]atural
and other resources are not so abundant that schemes of cooperation become superfluous, nor are conditions so harsh that fruitful ventures must inevitably break down."
Id. at 127.
10. He states that the classic principle is inferior to that of the average utility
principle in that the former, in maximizing satisfactions over the whole of society, can
allow for an indefinitely increasing population so that the sum of utilities added by
the greater number of persons makes up for the decline in per capita shares of wealth.
Id. at 162-63.
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care of the family. On the other hand, of course, a population that is
too small lacks the labor force to develop large industry and largescale farming. Thus, by limiting population I mean limiting it up to
a point. A rich nation thus trades off its potential for population
increase for material things. We have often heard the expression "He
may be a rich man, but he has no children, and therefore he's really
very poor." Similarly, a family in the United States that has two
children may be "poorer" in a very real way compared to a family in
India that has ten children. But then, why should the Indian family
have a claim against the U.S. family for a portion of the latter's
material wealth?
I think this question goes unanswered in Rawls' theory because
Rawls focuses upon the individual man's claim to being a morally
ethical person. He takes the individual as given, without considering
the dynamics of the fact that individuals can be produced in the same
sense that food is produced. In stating that every man should be
equal, Rawls overlooks the fact that some men have lots of children
while others do not. By granting their children immediate equality
in his ethical theory, Rawls overlooks the trade-offs stemming from
the probability that the man who had fewer children probably acquired more material wealth. The latter's greater wealth "cost" him
something, namely, fewer children. Thus it would be unjust to take
from him his wealth which he may have acquired at the cost of a
smaller family and hand it over to the man who produced a larger
family. At least, it would be unjust from the point of view of a comprehensive ethical theory such as Rawls' which would seem to require
such a result. I am not saying that there may not be some claims that
are not entirely just on the part of the masses in disadvantaged societies. But the justness of these claims would have to be evaluated in
far greater detail than Rawls' ethical theory seems to permit. The
result may very well be that a certain amount of "excess profits" tax,
perhaps labelled "foreign aid," should be paid to disadvantaged nations; but if this amount falls short of making everyone in the world
equally wealthy, the shortfall should not be viewed as an ethical
compromise, as Rawls' theory perhaps would require.
A second counter-argument to the levelling tendency in Rawls'
theory points back to the "supply" side of the picture: the earth's
resources are finite and non-infinitely renewable. Now suppose that
Rawls' "difference principle" applies between advantaged nation A
and disadvantaged nation D. Nation A would then be constrained by
the principles of justice to pay foreign aid to nation D until such time
as A loses its capital-formation incentives due to the heavy nature of
the "tax" that comprises this foreign aid. So, let us establish a maximum for the tax; say, forty percent of all income. If this forty percent
is five billion dollars per year, then A would pay to D five billion
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dollars annually. But what would D do with the money? If D used
the money for capital-formation, then in the course of time we might
expect the people of D to approach in personal wealth per capita the
people of A (assuming that there is no runaway population growth in
D, as per the preceding argument). But why would D necessarily have
the incentive to save and invest the money paid over by A? Human
nature being what it is, D might simply decide upon a program of
hedonistic consumption, spending for short-run pleasure five billion
dollars per year, secure in the knowledge that next year another five
billion dollars will be received from the hard-working people of A. In
other words, while the forty percent tax on A might not wipe out the
incentive to invest and produce within A, the payment of that forty
percent tax might wipe out any incentive to invest and produce
within D. As a result, a reckless consumption program may be set up,
cutting into the earth's stock of nonrenewable resources, to the detriment of all nations. D would proceed (in theory) on its merry way,
knowing that only by spending all of the five billion dollars per year
the people of D will remain technically "poor" and thus will ensure,
under Rawls' theory, continuing annual receipts of this amount of
foreign aid. Clearly, from a global perspective, this result is unjust.
It is unjust since it puts a premium upon short-run consumption of
natural resources. It is unjust because it induces the people of D to
spend, losing the virtue (if there is one) of thrift and saving. And it
is unjust to the people of A to take away forty percent of what they
earn by their labor so as to increase consumption in another country.
If we were dealing with a single society, the above consequences
of Rawls' theory might not apply. The institutions of a given society
might, for instance, restrict population growth, or put disincentives
upon large families. Also, laws might be passed that the recipients
of welfare must make an effort to find jobs or to save a portion of their
welfare payments or at least to refrain from a Veblenian kind of
conspicuous consumption. But once we look at international society,
we have the separate sovereignties (such as A and D) where rules like
this cannot necessarily obtain (even if they would be some inherent
part of Rawls' theory of a single society-and his book does not make
this clear by a long shot).
Rawls bases his theory of justice on the social contract model as
shaped by Kant, Locke, Rousseau, and, to a certain extent, Hobbes.
This is a relatively old political theory; it certainly antedates utilitarianism, Rawls' chief theoretical protagonist. Social contract theorists
probably were justified in looking at a single society before the days
when mass media and rapid travel made the world seem small. But
I tend to think that Rawls' book, no matter how up-to-date it sounds
in the invocation of recent economic theory, is somewhat anachronistic in that the vast problem of world justice that now confronts us is
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treated as largely irrelevant. Of course, as I said before, and the point
is worth repeating, one cannot fault Rawls for choosing to deal only
with the problem of justice within a given society. But it is necessary
for us to contextualize Rawls' work, to realize that a "solution" to the
problem of justice in a given society is not extendable by simple
extrapolation to the problem of world justice.
II.
Only at two brief and widely separated points in his book does
Rawls deal with the issue of justice transcending the self-contained
national communities which form the subject matter of his theory of
social justice," and there only to say that the question entails the
derivation of principles of justice for the law of nations. The law of
nations is explicitly considered in only one section of the book in the
context of a discussion of conscientious refusal.'" A conscientious
objector to a war which he considers illegal under international law
would cite the injustice of his nation's war policy. Thus Rawls finds
it important to examine the moral basis of the law of nations.
Rawls derives the ethical foundations of international law by the
use of his "social contract" technique which forms the basis of his
entire work. The social contract theory briefly involves a hypothetical
situation of men coming together in what Rawls calls the "original
position" to decide upon basic constitutional rules for their society.
The men in the original position operate under a "veil of ignorance:"
they do not know how their decisions will affect their own particular
3
case because they do not know their own particular circumstances.'
Thus they will choose principles that minimize their potential losses
under the constitution (using the maximum concept of the theory of
games'). In particular, they will not choose the utilitarian principle,
since the maximization of the sum of advantages in a society can be
at the expense of a minority of the population (for example, if a
minority slave population would greatly increase the happiness of the
majority, then classical utilitarian theory would appear to countenance slavery'5). Since no one, in the original position, knows what
his subsequent personality or social status will be, he will not vote
for a principle that allows a chance that he will be among the greatly
disadvantaged class. It follows deductively (according to Rawls) that
the men in the original position will first of all choose "equal liberty"
for all:
11. Id. at
12. Id. at
13. Id. at
14. Id. at
15. Id. at
to refine their
judge at what

8, 457.
377-82.
136-37.
152-54.
158-59. Rawls acknowledges that classical utilitarians have attempted
theories so that this particular result does not obtain. The reader must
point utilitarianism is vitiated by such refinements.
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Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system
of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for
all."

The other major principle that the men in the original position will
choose recognizes that there will be social and economic inequalities
in society (otherwise there would be no incentive to save, invest, and
produce, but mitigates the inequalities by requiring that they be
arranged so that they: (a) are attached to offices open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity 7 and (b) accrue to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (the "difference principle" discussed earlier). 18
When he turns to the question of conscientious refusal and international law, Rawls simply extends the above interpretation of the
original position to apply to representatives of the different nations.
The representatives know nothing about the particular circumstances
of their own nations, such as power, strength, geographical position,
population, or other factors. Thus the original position is "fair between nations; it nullifiesthe contingencies and biases of historical
fate," according to Rawls. 9 Not surprisingly, then, the nations, representatives would choose the principle of equality as the most important ethical basis of international law. Rawls briefly lists the consequences of the principle of equality:
(1) self-determination, without the intervention of foreign powers;
(2) the right of self-defense against attack, including the right to form
defensive alliances to protect this right;
(3) the rule that treaties are to be honored, provided they are consistent
with the other principles governing the relations of states;
(4) principles regulating the means that a nation may use to wage war."

Rawls does not elaborate on these consequences, giving the impression that they speak for themselves and are relatively unambiguous. However, international law, particularly with respect to recent
international developments, raises complexities that in my opinion
not only make it difficult to apply the above concepts, but also render
them, in some cases, internally inconsistent. Take the matter of selfdetermination. The difficult problem is, self-determination over what
particular area? Nation A may claim that it is having an internal civil
war over the question of its national boundaries, but group B, the
rebels, may claim that B is a nation that is being invaded by A.
Often, A characterizes the conflict as between one section of the
country and another (North and South Korea, North and South Viet16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 302.
at 83-89.
at 75-83; see also, supra note 8.
at 378.
at 378-79.
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nam, East and West Pakistan). But B will characterize the war as
one between two separate nations ("Bangladesh").
Other nations will respond variously to these claims, supporting
one characterization or the other. Thus, we really have a threshold
question, under the Rawls analysis, as to what is a "nation" that may
claim self-determination. Who is to be a "representative" of a
"nation?" Does East Germany have a right to have a representative
in the Rawlsian "original position?" If we cannot decide this in an a
priori fashion, then there appears to be an inconsistency in the "self"
part of the phrase "self-determination." At least when Rawls is dealing with people, he distinguishes one person from another, and says
that all are entitled to equal liberty. But when nations are considered,
it is sometimes very hard to distinguish one nation from another when
the very issue is whether a distinction should be made, or whether it
is simply another "civil war."
Another dilemma, short of the civil war situation, arises when a
nation decides to intervene in the internal affairs of another nation
for the purpose of preserving the liberty or lives of an oppressed
minority group within that nation. (Present-day examples may include the situation of the Black-Africans in Namibia or the Palestinians in Israel.) The nation involved will cite the principle of equality,
the concept of sovereignty and self-determination, the principle
against intervention, and related rights stemming from what Rawls
calls the original position. They will also deny that the minority
group is oppressed. Rawls would appear to support the noninterventionists, and indeed there is nothing in his book that would
indicate his recognition of an exception to the non-intervention consequence of the principle of equality of nations. Yet, interestingly,
without realizing the potential contradiction, Rawls at another point
writes of a justification of military conscription:
Conscription is permissible only if it is demanded for the defense of
liberty itself, including here not only the liberties of the citizens of the
society in question, but also those of persons in other societies as well."1

In other words, Rawls recognizes that persons may be justly conscripted to fight in a war that is in defense of the liberties of persons
in another society. Yet is not that precisely the justification of the
Vietnam War that was used to support conscription in the United
States? Were not Americans being drafted to preserve the liberty of
certain South Vietnamese citizens who were resisting the Communist
movement for the unification of Vietnam. (I do not think that anyone
can claim that there were no South Vietnamese whose liberty was
directly threatened and who welcomed our support; the only issue
21. Id. at 380.
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that divides those who supported and those who opposed the Vietnam
War was the number of these South Vietnamese citizens and perhaps
their representativeness.)
Judging from the authorities he cites, Rawls seems to side with
those who resisted the draft for the Vietnam War. However, his own
admission that one may be legally and justly drafted to fight to preserve the liberties of persons in another country seems to undercut
his own position. Much more significantly, it undercuts his theory
about the equality of states in the original position giving rise to the
principle of non-intervention.
Could Rawls dispense with the principle of non-intervention? I
do not think that would help resolve the dilemma just stated, since
the dilemma goes to the heart of the theory that nations can start out
in an "original position" the same way that persons can. For in devising a theory of justice, any philosopher has to decide what it is that
is basic to his theory. Rawls seems to have made the decision
throughout most of his book (even if it is unclear or missing in the
particular section I am now criticizing concerning the law of nations)
that what is basic is the equal liberty of persons. Equal liberty is so
important that it may be viewed not as a derivation from the "original position" but as a characterization of it. Although Rawls does not
want to make this kind of concession, arguably equal liberty of persons forms the basis of his description of how persons in the original
position come to agreements with each other. (If they were not already equal, then some would be able to push through principles that
would favor themselves at the expense of others, a possibility that
Rawls does not and cannot acknowledge.) In any event, whatever one
decides on the priority of equal liberty or the original position, it is
clear that the equal liberty of persons is at the cornerstone of the
edifice constructed by Rawls.
Now, taking the principle of the equal liberty of persons, one
might ask whether an analogous principle of the equal liberty of
nations could be in conflict with the equal liberty of persons. Rawls
assumes that no conflict can arise. But clearly, in his own example
of permissible conscription, a conflict does arise. In order to protect
the equal liberty of persons in nation B, nation A must violate the
equal liberty of nation B and intervene in B's internal affairs. If
nation A did not do this, then the persons in nation B would be
deprived (by their own government) of their equal liberty. Nor could
Rawls escape this dilemma by arguing that, therefore, B is simply an
unjust society, for if it is unjust, the issue of its internal unequal
liberty is not relevant to Rawls' book. For then the question would
simply reappear on another plane; namely should just and unjust
nations be given equal liberty in the original position? If they should,
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then as a consequence some persons will be deprived of equal liberty
(those persons in unjust nations). And thus Rawls' own theory will
result, at the outset, in a deprivation of some persons' equal liberty,
under the banner of equality of abstract concepts (nations). I doubt
whether Rawls would welcome such a consequence of his theory of
justice; it certainly seems to be utilitarianism writ large (that is, the
equal liberty of persons in some societies, and the equal liberty of
societies themselves, outweigh the unequal liberties of other persons
in unjust societies).
If we look to the other consequences of Rawls' concept of the
equality of nations, we may find similar disabilities. Are all treaties
to be kept? What about "unequal" treaties-those imposed by the
larger power upon the smaller? Does this deprive the citizens of the
smaller power of their just share or equal liberties, all in the name of
a concept that sanctifies treaties? What is self-defense? The "self"
in "self-defense" may be as ambiguous as the "self" in "selfdetermination." And so on. Instead of continuing along this line, let
us step back and take a larger look at the implications of this discussion.

mI.

In the first place, one might conclude that Rawls has not been
persuasive in analogizing nations to individuals in the original position, and therefore if we want individual justice we may have to
forego the concept of equality of nations. However, if this is true, it
will not be because Rawls has proved it, since he tried to show something quite different. A much different theory would have to be advanced for this proposition, with greater explicit concern for international legal principles. To some extent, principles have been urged in
recent years that can be characterized as treating nations unequally.
The Clark and Sohn proposal for weighted voting in the United Nations, taking into account the population of nations and some related
factors that are not evenly distributed, was an attempt to adjust
voting principles to what Clark and Sohn viewed as the facts of international lifeY From a functionalist standpoint, some nations are represented on more international organizations than other nations; perhaps this is a recognition of inequality. Professor McDougal and his
associates have at times argued for a view of international law that
would treat some nations as non-participants or outlaws; this too
indicates inequality.?
22. G. CLARK & L. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW (2d ed. 1960).
23. 1 have discussed this more fully in A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW

218-20 (1971).
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However, nations probably will never accept a principle of less
than one-nation-one-vote. Why should they, as nations? I would like
to see international law viewed as a creation of nation-states that is
functionally adapted to solving a number of the problems that arise
in inter-state dealings, particularly problems of jurisdiction. But international law certainly does not solve all problems. It has limited
usefulness, within its own sphere.
Thus, secondly, we should ask whether one ought to revise the
principle of equality of nations in order to comport with the thrust of
Rawls' arguments concerning social justice. I would contend that
such a revision would only serve to discredit international law in the
areas where it now serves us well. I cannot see that international law
would retain much moral force if nations were treated differentially
under it. In the sense of providing moral force to legal institutions, I
would agree with Rawls' characterization of the principle of equal
liberty as the cornerstone of justice.
A third possibility is to retain equality of nations, but to incorporate into the fabric of international law other principles that more
fully realize the equality of man. This is the hard approach, but it is
one which, I believe, is slowly working itself out in practice even if it
is not articulated too often. The Genocide Convention" has gradually
come to be recognized as this sort of breakthrough. In it, nations
voluntarily agreed that some kinds of treatment of their own nationals within their own boundaries were not internationally acceptable.
Now, one might say that the principle of equality of nations was
acknowledged in that the signatories were free to ratify or not to ratify
the Genocide Convention. Thus, if they voluntarily agreed to compromise the general principle of self-determination, then the resulting
consequence of a potential intervention in domestic affairs (authorized, at least theoretically, by the Convention) was at least selfwilled.
But this kind of analysis is not wholly satisfactory from an ethical standpoint. Analogously, suppose someone of his own free will
sold his person into slavery; his slavery "contract" would nevertheless
be unenforceable in most legal regimes. So too, if nations voluntarily
compromise their initial equality, it might be argued that such a
compromise is unenforceable (for example, a nation that someday
actually commits genocide will undoubtedly argue to the world that
it renounces the Genocide Convention and regards it as an unwarranted present intrusion upon national sovereignty. Therefore, we
have to search for deeper principles than "national equality." A more
detailed theory of justice as applied to nations would attempt to
24. 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948).
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articulate principles and priority rules that would account, say, for
both the legal equality of states and the legality of intervention to
save minority groups that are threatened with actions that would
contravene the Genocide Convention.
More generally, all international law affects, to some extent, the
domestic jurisdiction of a state. Consider, as the easiest example,
whether a national traveling abroad carries with him a protective
shield of domestic law or whether he is subject to the law of the
foreign country. Any court award against a nation intrudes upon its
domestic affairs; if it has to pay money damages, the money has to
come out of the domestic treasury. What constitutes "foreign relations" is thus a relative question, and it may be an expanding concept
depending upon what states do and how they articulate what they
do.25 Thus, in one sense, the equality of nations has always been
subject to the strictures, qualifications, and confinements of international law. More recently, the enterprise is exploding with the emerging human rights laws. I would argue that we cannot begin to assess
the ethics of the law of nations without first becoming familiar with
the content of international law in both its present and its emerging
form. Perhaps in our lifetimes we shall not see the emergence of a
complete theory of international justice. But at least we should recognize the importance of such a venture.
25. I have expanded on this in D'AMATO, supra note 23 at 79-81.

